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Abstract—Increasing reliance on Information and Communi-
cation Technology (ICT) exposes the power grid to cyber-attacks.
In particular, Coordinated Cyber-Attacks (CCAs) are considered
highly threatening and difficult to defend against, because they
(i) possess higher disruptiveness by integrating greater resources
from multiple attack entities, and (ii) present heterogeneous traits
in cyber-space and the physical grid by hitting multiple targets
to achieve the attack goal. Thus, and as opposed to independent
attacks, whose severity is limited by the power grid’s redundancy,
CCAs could inflict disastrous consequences, such as blackouts. In
this paper, we propose a method to develop Correlation Indices
to defend against CCAs on static control applications. These
proposed indices relate the targets of CCAs with attack goals on
the power grid. Compared to related works, the proposed indices
present the benefits of deployment simplicity and are capable
of detecting more sophisticated attacks, such as measurement
attacks. We demonstrate our method using measurement attacks
against Security Constrained Economic Dispatch.
Index Terms—Power Grid, Cyber-Physical Systems, Cyber-
Security, Coordinated Cyber-Attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The operation of today’s power grid largely relies on
automated control applications and Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. While control appli-
cations compute the commands to operate the power grid,
SCADA serves as the channel between control applications
and field devices [1] by transmitting measurement and control
signals. The desire to improve the efficiency and reliability
of control applications and SCADA has led to the use of
heterogeneous and non-proprietary ICT [2]. However, this
heterogeneous and non-proprietary ICT increases the number
of cyber-vulnerabilities, opening up a much wider scope of
cyber-security concerns among utilities.
By exploiting cyber-vulnerabilities, malicious adversaries
can launch cyber-attacks against control applications and
SCADA, among which Coordinated Cyber-Attacks (CCAs) are
considered highly threatening and difficult to defend against.
This is because CCAs (i) possess higher disruptiveness by
integrating resources from multiple attack entities, and (ii)
present heterogeneous traits in cyber-space and the physical
grid by hitting multiple targets to achieve the attack goal. Thus,
and as opposed to regular (or independent) attacks, whose
severity is limited by the power grid’s redundancy, CCAs
could inflict catastrophic consequences as exemplified by the
famous cyber-attacks against the Ukrainian power grid (the
“BlackEnergy” malware attack in 2015 [3], [4], and the “Crash
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Override” attack in 2016 [5]). These massive cyber-attacks
could trigger power outages, leaving thousands of consumers
and facilities without electricity.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are necessary tools to
protect control applications and SCADA against cyber-attacks.
IDSs record and analyze cyber-traces from adversaries that
breach into the grid’s cyber-system to exploit vulnerabilities.
If, after analyzing cyber-traces, the security of the grid ap-
pears to be compromised, then IDSs will generate alarms. In
addition, some IDSs will also take actions to mitigate attacks’
effect. While IDSs can detect regular attacks or individual
components of CCAs, they suffer from false alarms, fail to
identify CCAs, and cannot estimate the attack consequences
on the grid.
To identify CCAs and estimate attack consequences, recent
works suggest to integrate intrusion data from IDSs with attack
templates –attack templates model cyber-attacks against con-
trol applications. This integration results in a set of Correlation
Indices (CIs) describing the temporal and/or spatial correlation
of coordinated attacks.
A. Related Works
Many CIs have been proposed in the literature; however,
they differ in their principles, which we summarize below.
1) CIs based on adversaries’ cyber traces: Attack se-
quences of the same adversary have similar cyber-traces that
can be identified as contributing to CCAs. IDSs use this
detection principle to investigate the temporal correlation of
intrusions in cyber-space. Anomaly matrices [6] and Time
Failure Propagation Graphs [4] are proposed to relate intrusion
time with intrusion actions. While capable of detecting CCAs
at the cyber-space, CIs of this type fail to estimate the attack
consequences on the grid.
2) CIs based on cyber-physical dependence: Logic graphs
describing the conditions (in sequence in the cyber-space)
for a physical consequence to take place can be used to
derive CIs [7]. The logic graphs can take forms of attack
trees [8], attack graphs [9], and PetriNets [10]. Temporal
correlation of attacks is derived not only in the cyber-space
but also in the physical power grid (see Fig. 2 in [11] for an
example). However, constructing these logic graphs requires
great computational effort due to the large number of cyber
and physical components.
3) CIs based on attack goals on the physical grid: Ad-
versaries’ goals described with reliability metrics or in terms
of the criticality of a certain target are used to derive CIs.
For example, in [4], substations are attack targets and their
2criticality is first ranked. In [12], the attack goal is modeled
as causing an insufficient power transfer. The work takes a
numerical approach by disconnecting a set of substations at
one time and running power flow. The substations in the set
are identified as correlated if the power flow is divergent.
Given the great size of power grids, the combined deploy-
ment of CIs based on cyber-traces and attack goals promises
better computation performance and higher accuracy than
the CIs based on cyber-physical dependence. The existing
CIs based on attack goals, however, are limited to a few
goals achieved by corrupting control commands. Other cyber-
attacks, such as measurement attacks, present much higher
threats in coordination (as a rich body of literature has shown
their impact in electricity markets and security constrained
power flows [13]–[15]). This is because measurement attacks
are (i) difficult to detect by hiding in measurement signals
and deceiving through control applications, and (ii) capable
of inflicting disastrous consequences by coordinating attacks
against multiple grid components.
B. Our Work
This paper proposes a method to derive Correlation Indices
based on attack goals for the following attack template:
measurement attacks against Security Constrained Economic
Dispatch (SCED). In particular, we make the following con-
tributions.
1) An analytical method to derive CIs. We formulate the
attack template as a bilevel mix-integer optimization
program. This problem is challenging due to its non-
convex and combinatorial nature. To address these chal-
lenges, we propose an algorithm that computes the CIs
based on attack goals.
2) A collection of set-theoretic properties for the CIs. These
properties relate attack goals to the targets of CCAs.
3) Defense strategies against CCAs, a metric of defense
effectiveness, and the application of CIs to identify
CCAs.
Though we present our method to derive CIs for SCED, we
emphasize that our method can be extended to other static
control applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the concepts of static applications and attack tem-
plates. The mathematical models of SCED and the attack
template in bilevel form are presented in Sections 3 and 4,
respectively. The CIs are derived in Section 5. Section 6
describes the CIs’ properties, defense strategies, the metric
of defense effectiveness, and the application of CIs to identify
CCAs. In Section 7, the CIs are demonstrated with numerical
experiments. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the concepts of static applications
and attack templates.
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Fig. 1: Static Control Application. At substation sk , we illus-
trate its Information and Communication Technology, includ-
ing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs).
A. Static Control Applications
Static Applications are control loops designed to monitor,
supervise, and control the grid’s operating point –i.e., they
ignore the dynamics and work with the grid at a quasi-steady
state. These applications can be automated or executed by
a human operator. Examples include Security Constrained
Economic Dispatch (SCED), Optimal Reactive Power Support,
and dispatch in Electricity Markets.
Fig. 1 illustrates a schematic of a static application. These
applications compute control commands by solving optimiza-
tion algorithms or by allowing direct manipulation via a
Human Machine Interface. In any case, the control commands
are computed based on measurements collected at remote
substations. To verify the integrity of these measurements,
most well-known applications implement state estimation and
bad data detection.
B. Attack Templates
Attack templates describe models of cyber-attacks on control
applications. We consider two basic cyber-attacks: control
and measurement attacks. In control attacks, the adversary
modifies control commands directly (Fig. 2a). In measurement
attacks, the adversary modifies control commands indirectly by
corrupting measurements (Fig. 2b). Since remote substations
collect the measurements and operate physical devices (e.g.,
circuit breakers or capacitors), we assume that control and/or
measurement attacks are executed by hacking into remote
substations.
Attack templates have been used in the literature to de-
termine the consequences of cyber-attacks, identify critical
components of the grid, derive defense strategies, etc. For
instance, by studying the attack template of measurement
attacks on state estimation, several authors have proposed to
stop the attacks by enhancing the screening methods of state
estimation [16]. This defense strategy, however, fails if the
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Fig. 2: Control and measurement attacks. u : control command,
y : measurements. u , u˜ (y , y˜) during the cyber-attack.
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Fig. 3: Relation graphs between ns targets (sk) and m attack
goals (θi). For example, the targets associated to θ3 are
{s5, s6, sns }, and to θm are {s2, s4, s5, s6}
.
static application does not have state estimation, which is often
true for real-time and contingency dispatch.
In this paper, we consider the following attack template:
measurement attacks against SCED. This attack template
describes an adversary with the following characteristics.
1) The adversary knows the models of the power grid and
SCED.
2) The adversary can hack into the substations’ ICT and
inject falsified measurements to manipulate SCED.
3) The adversary can coordinate the attack against multiple
substations over a large geographic area –i.e., launch
Coordinated Cyber-Attacks (CCAs).
We use the attack template to derive Correlation Indices (CIs).
These CIs describe a relation between the target substations
and the attack goal (Fig. 3).
Remark 1. The adversary’s characteristics might be restrictive.
However, they were selected for convenience of CIs’ devel-
opment and can be relaxed at the expense of more involved
computations. For example, to relax the first characteristic,
existing studies [17], [18] developed stochastic methods to
launch attacks with limited information. Other studies [19],
[20] presented methods for estimating the power grid model
with region-constrained information from multiple adversaries.
The stochastic and estimation methods can easily be applied
to extend the CIs’ development method in future studies.
III. MATHEMATICAL MODELS
In this section, we describe the models of the power grid
and Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED).
A. Mathematical Notation
Throughout this paper, we use the following notation. Let R
and R≥0 (resp. R>0) denote the set of real numbers and non-
negative (resp. positive) real numbers. For n > 1, In denotes
the n-dimensional identity matrix. 1 and 0 denote, respectively,
the vectors (or matrices) with all components equal to one and
zero. Given a finite set V , we let |V | denote its cardinality, i.e.,
the number of elements of V , and 2V the power set of V , i.e.,
the set of all subsets of V .
For a matrix A ∈ Rn×m, [A]i and [A]ij denote its ith row
and its (i, j)th element. Given a vector x ∈ Rn, xi denotes the
ith element, diag(x) the diagonal matrix of x, and | |x | |0 the
zero norm of x, i.e., the number of non-zero elements of x.
We let | |x | |∞ denote the infinity norm defined as | |x | |∞ :=
max{|xi |}. For two vectors x, y ∈ R
n, x ◦ y = z ∈ Rn denotes
the Hadamard or element-wise product, i.e., zi = xi yi , and
x  y denotes the element-wise inequality, i.e., xi ≤ yi .
B. Power Grid Modeling
We model the power grid as the graph G = (V, E), where
V and E ⊂ V × V are the sets of n := |V | buses and
m := |E | transmission lines. To each bus i ∈ V , we associate
the generation Pg,i ∈ R≥0, and the demand Pd,i ∈ R≥0;
to each transmission line e := (i, j) ∈ E , connecting buses
i, j ∈ V , we associate the power flow Pf ,e ∈ R. In vector
form, the generation, demand, and power flows are respec-
tively Pg = [Pg,1, . . . , Pg,n]
⊤, Pd = [Pd,1, . . . , Pd,n]
⊤, and
Pf = [Pf ,1, . . . , Pf ,m]
⊤.
In addition, we assume the grid has a set of ns substations,
i.e., S = {s1, s2, . . . , sns }. At substation sk , we represent the
grid within its service area as the sub-graph Gsk = (Vsk , Esk )
with the following properties.
1) Substation service areas compose the entire power grid,
i.e., ∪sk ∈SGsk = G.
2) Substation service areas may overlap, i.e., for some
sk, sl ∈ S, we may have Gsk∩Gsl , ∅, but the overlapped
areas do not have buses with generation.
3) Each substation collects demand measurements, denoted
as P˜d ∈ R
n, within its service area.
C. Security Constrained Economic Dispatch
We consider a SCED problem that computes a new gener-
ation profile P∗g based on demand measurements P˜d.
The SCED problem is formulated based on the power flow
equations. The power flow equations are the mathematical
model to plan, operate, and analyze the power grid. They
describe how generation and demand balance, and how active
and reactive power flow through the grid.
For large-scale power grids, however, the coupled active
and reactive power flow model might become computationally
expensive and even unfeasible. Thus, a decoupled (DC) power
flow might be the only viable alternative to solve large-scale
problems. DC power flow is simpler and more robust due
to sparsity and linearity, but it is only accurate close to the
operating point [21]. We refer the interested reader to [22]
and [23] for more information on how utilities use DC power
flow.
We formulate SCED (based on DC power flow) as a
convex optimization problem that minimizes the total gener-
ation cost (1a) subject to the following security constraints:
4generation-demand balance (1b), operation limits of the gen-
erators (1c), and transmission limits on power flows (1d), i.e.,
min
Pg
1
2
P⊤gC2Pg + c
⊤
1 Pg + c0, (1a)
s.t 1⊤Pg − 1
⊤P˜d = 0, (1b)
Pg ∈ [0, P¯g], (1c)
F(Pg − P˜d)︸        ︷︷        ︸
=:Pf
∈ [−P¯f , P¯f ], (1d)
where c2, c1, c0 ∈ R
n
≥0
are the cost coefficients for generation,
C2 = diag(c2), P¯g ∈ R
n
≥0
is the rated power from generators,
P¯f ∈ R
m
≥0
is the thermal capacity of transmission lines, and F
is the generator shift matrix.
IV. ATTACK TEMPLATE
In this section, we describe the attack template in bilevel
form. The attack template models measurement attacks against
SCED. We also describe the attack goal and constraints.
A. Measurement Attacks
Let a ∈ Rn denote the attack signal. The adversary fabri-
cates a to corrupt measurements of the demand as follows
P˜d(a) = Pd + a. (2)
We assume the adversary injects a by hacking into substations
and altering measurements at the data concentrator (or at a
communication link via a man-in-the-middle attack). Thus, in
the rest of the paper, we refer the target data concentrator and
ICT within the substation as the target substation.
B. The Attack Goal
Using the corrupted measurements (2), the adversary has
the following attack goal: to manipulate SCED and increase
the power flow on a single target line e ∈ E , which occurs at
|Pf ,e(a)| = |[F]e(P
∗
g(a) − Pd)| ≥ (1 + τ)|Pf ,e(0)|, (3)
where Pf ,e(a) ∈ R (resp. Pf ,e(0) ∈ R) denotes the power flow
on e after (resp. before) the attack, P∗g(a) ∈ R
n denotes the
new (after the attack) generation profile, and τ ∈ (0, τ¯] ⊆ R>0
quantifies the flow increase.
We use the notation (e, τ˜) ∈ E × (0, τ¯] to describe attack
goals satisfying (3). Since τ ∈ (0, τ¯], we can have (in theory)
an infinite number of attack goals. In practice, however, we
study a finite number of attack goals τ. For example, the attack
goal τ that will cause congestion (relating to economic loss),
overloading (increasing long-term capital cost by accelerating
asset depreciation, increasing losses), and loss of transmission
lines (under very stressful operating condition). Thus, in the
worst case scenario, we assume the adversary maximizes the
flow increase τ.
C. Attack Constraints
The attack might be constrained due to the following.
1) State estimation and bad data detection.
2) Corruptible measurements and defense at substations.
3) Attack resources.
Since SCED has state estimation, the adversary must design
the attack signal a to bypass bad data detection. Other appli-
cations, however, might not have state estimation, and hence
the attack signal a can take any (realistic) value. In any case,
we write this constraint as | |a| |∞ ≤ a¯ where a¯ > 0. We can use
a¯ as a design parameter to model different attack scenarios.
If the defender protects substation sk ∈ S, then the adversary
cannot corrupt measurements at sk ; otherwise, the adversary
can corrupt all the measurements. We write this constraint as
ai ∈ δsk [−a¯, a¯], ∀i ∈ Vsk ,∀sk ∈ S, δsk ∈ {0, 1}, (4)
where δsk = 1 if the adversary attacks sk , and δsk = 0 if not.
The vector δ(e, τ) = [δs1, δs2, . . . , δsns ]
⊤ describes safe and
target substations during CCAs with an attack goal (e, τ).
If the adversary has limited resources, then (s)he must limit
the number of target substations. We write this constraint as
| |δ(e, τ)| |0 ≤ κ, (5)
where κ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ns} denotes the maximum number of
target substations. In the worst case scenario, the adversary
minimizes κ.
Remark 2. Note that in the worst case scenario the adversary
faces two conflicting objectives: maximize τ and minimize
κ. The interaction τ − κ generates a Pareto-like behavior
between aimed flow increase (τ) and the number of target
substations (κ).
D. Attack Template in Bilevel Form
We use bilevel optimization to model the attack template,
describing the worst case scenario of measurement attacks
against SCED. Since bilevel optimization models decision
making among agents [24] (e.g., adversary vs defender),
researchers have used it to study cyber-attacks [25], [26]); or
physical attacks [27] to power grids.
We write the attack template in bilevel form as follows:
max
τ,κ,δ,a
τ − κ,
s.t. Eqs. (3) − (5), (6)
where P∗g(a) denotes the optimal solution of the SCED opti-
mization algorithm, parametrized by the attack signal a, i.e.,
P∗g(a) ∈ argmin
Pg
1
2
P⊤gC2Pg + c
⊤
1 Pg + c0,
s.t 1⊤Pg − 1
⊤(Pd + a) = 0, (7)
A0Pg + A1a − b  0.
with
A0 :=

−In
In
F
−F

, A1 =

0
0
−F
F

, b =

0
P¯g
P¯f
−P¯f

− A1Pd.
5In the above, the upper level problem (6) models the attack
goal and constraints, while the lower level problem (7) models
the SCED manipulated through corrupted measurements (a).
The optimal solution of the bilevel form (τ∗, κ∗, δ∗, a∗, P∗g),
if it exists, describes an adversary that targets the least number
of substations (κ∗ and δ∗) and maximizes the flow increase (τ∗)
on the single line e ∈ E .
The bilevel form (6)-(7) depends on several parameters,
including the power grid parameters, the SCED parameters,
and the maximum value for the attack signal a¯. Thus, a
defender, using the attack template, can select the parameters
to study different scenarios.
Remark 3. By defining the corresponding attack goal, con-
straints, and control algorithm, we can model measurement
attacks against other static applications, using the attack tem-
plate in bilevel form. In addition, we can model control attacks
using the upper level problem (6).
V. DERIVING THE CORRELATION INDICES
In this section, we derive the key concepts, Correlation
Indices (CIs) and security index. We obtain the indices by
transforming the attack template in bilevel form into a Math-
ematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) and
addressing its mathematical challenges.
A. Attack Template in Mathematical Programming Form
Since the lower level problem (7) is strictly convex on Pg
for a fixed a, its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are
necessary and sufficient for optimality [28]. So, we can write
the bilevel form (6)-(7) as a Mathematical Program with Equi-
librium Constraints (MPEC) (i.e., a single-level optimization
problem [29]), by replacing (7) with the KKT conditions. This
yields
max
τ,κ,δ,a,P∗g
τ − κ, (8a)
s.t. Eqs. (3) − (5), (8b)
1
⊤P∗g − 1
⊤(a + Pd) = 0, (8c)
C2P
∗
g + c1 − 1ν
∗
+ A⊤0 λ
∗
= 0, (8d)
A0P
∗
g + A1a − b  0, (8e)
λ
∗  0, (8f)
λ
∗ ◦ (A0P
∗
g + A1a − b) = 0. (8g)
In the above, (8c)-(8g) are the KKT conditions of (7) and
ν∗ (resp. λ∗) denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the equality
(resp. inequality) constraint of (7).
B. Mathematical Challenges
The MPEC (8) is a challenging problem. Its properties are
far more complex than the properties of traditional math-
ematical programming problems, making the standard non-
linear programming approach inapplicable [29]. These chal-
lenges arise because the MPEC (8) is nonconvex, is non-
differentiable, and has two conflicting objectives.
The complementary slackness constraint (8g) makes the
MPEC (8) nonconvex. To address this challenge, we linearize
(8g) using the Big M method [29]. Let M > 0 be a sufficiently
large constant, then (8g) is equivalent to
λ
∗  M(1 − ω), −(A0P
∗
g + A1a − b)  Mω, (9)
where ω ∈ {0, 1}2(n+m) is a binary decision variable.
The attack goal constraint (3) makes the MPEC (8) non-
differentiable. To address this challenge, we proceed as fol-
lows. Since the flow on e before the attack Pf ,e(0) can be
computed using (1), the attack goal constraint (3) can be
written as{
[F]e(P
∗
g(a) − Pd) ≥ (1 + τ) Pf ,e(0), if Pf ,e(0) ≥ 0,
[F]e(P
∗
g(a) − Pd) ≤ (1 + τ) Pf ,e(0), if Pf ,e(0) < 0.
(10)
The MPEC (8) has two conflicting objectives, i.e.,max τ−κ.
To address this challenge, we minimize κ (i.e., the number
of target substations) and let τ ≥ τ˜ where τ˜ is a predefined
flow increase. We can attach semantics to τ˜, e.g., the (τ˜) that
triggers the line’s protection.
The proposed solutions for the challenges transform the
MPEC (8) into the following mixed-integer linear program-
ming problem
min
τ,κ,δ,a,P∗g
κ,
s.t. τ ≥ τ˜, (11)
Eqs. (4), (5), (8c)-(8f), (9) and (10).
C. Algorithm: Deriving the CIs
The optimal solutions κ∗ and δ∗(e, τ˜) of (11) denote, respec-
tively, the security index and the Correlation Index (CI) for the
attack goal (e, τ˜). The security index κ∗ determines the least
number of target substations to increase the flow (τ˜) on line
e, while the Correlation Index δ∗(e, τ˜) describes which target
substations. This CI represents a strongly correlated CCA since
it relates the least number of target substations with the attack
goal (e, τ˜).
Though the security index κ∗ is unique, the CI might not be.
Other CCAs attacking κ∗ substations might also increase the
flow (τ˜) on line e –this is a consequence of the combinatorial
nature of (11). All the CIs, however, are feasible solutions
of (11) with κ = κ∗, which we use to develop the following
algorithm.
Given the attack goal (e, τ˜), Algorithm 1 computes the
security index first, and then the CIs by exploring which of the(κ∗
ns
)
combinations of target substations are feasible solutions
of (11) with κ = κ∗.
D. Limitations
Our method has a limitation, namely the computation per-
formance of Algorithm 1, which we discuss next.
Algorithm 1 only promises local optimal solutions in finite
time. This is because the mixed-integer linear problem (11)
and the
(
κ∗
ns
)
− 1 feasibility problems are in general NP-hard.
Given that there is only a few substations in a power grid, the
computation time of the proposed algorithm is unlikely to be
6Algorithm 1 Deriving the Security Index and CIs
1: (κ∗,CIs) ← CorrelationIndices(e, τ˜)
2: procedure CORRELATIONINDICES(e, τ˜)
3: CIs ← {∅}
4: Compute κ∗ by solving (11)
5: for j = 1 to
(κ∗
ns
)
do
6: if δ( j) is feasible (of (11) with κ = κ∗) then
7: CIs = {CIs, δ( j)}
8: return (κ∗,CIs)
a problem. However, in case of abrupt changes occurring in
the power grid, CIs will need to be updated at run-time and
an algorithm providing theoretic bounds of convergence must
be sought after. These tasks are out of the scope of this paper,
but they will be part of our future work.
VI. APPLYING THE CIS TO PROTECT AGAINST CCAS
In this section, we describe properties of the Correlation
Indices (CIs) using a set theoretic approach. These properties
allows us to derive defense implications and applications in
IDS.
A. CIs’ Properties
Let Sα, j ∈ 2
S describe the set of target substations during a
CCA. If the CCA is effective, i.e., if the CCA increases the
flow (τ˜) on line e ∈ E , we use the notation Sα, j → (e, τ˜);
otherwise we use Sα, j 6→ (e, τ˜). We collect all effective CCAs
in the set
Sα(e, τ˜) := {Sα, j | Sα, j → (e, τ˜)} ⊂ 2
S
.
The next proposition shows that if the CCA S′
α, j fails to
increase the flow (τ˜) on line e, then all subordinated at-
tacks Sα, j ⊂ S
′
α, j
also fail to increase the flow on e.
Proposition 1. (Subordinated CCAs.) If S′
α, j
< Sα(e, τ˜), then
Sα, j < Sα(e, τ˜) for any Sα, j ⊂ S
′
α, j
.
Proof. Appendix. 
Definition 1. Let δ∗(e, τ˜) denote a feasible solution of Algo-
rithm 1 (i.e., | |δ∗(e, τ˜)| |0 = κ
∗). A CI, denoted as S∗
α, j
, is a
strongly correlated CCA that extracts target substations from
δ∗(e, τ˜) as follows
S∗α, j := {sk ∈ S | δ
∗
k(e, τ˜) , 0}, (12)
and reaches the goal (e, τ˜), i.e., S∗
α, j
∈ Sα(e, τ˜).
A CI has minimal cardinality, i.e., the CI is effective by
attacking the least number of substations, which we state next.
Proposition 2. (Minimal Cardinality.) Let S∗
α, j ∈ S
∗
α(e, τ˜) be a
CI. Then S′
α, j
6→ (e, τ˜) for any S′
α, j
∈ 2S satisfying |S′
α, j
| < κ∗.
Proof. Appendix. 
Note that Proposition 1 and 2 guarantee security against
subordinated CCAs of the CI S∗
α, j
.
CIs are not unique since there might be another CCA S′
α, j
satisfying |S′
α, j
| = κ∗ and S′
α, j
∈ Sα(e, τ˜). We collect all CIs
in the set
S∗α(e, τ˜) := {S
∗
α, j | S
∗
α, j is a CI} ⊆ Sα(e, τ˜).
The following lemma states that any CCA containing the
CI S∗
α, j
∈ S∗α(e, τ˜) can increase the flow on line e ∈ E .
Lemma 1. Let S∗
α, j
∈ S∗α(e, τ˜) denote a CI. Suppose there
exists another set of target substations S′
α, j
∈ 2S, then (S∗
α, j
∪
S′
α, j
) ∈ Sα(e, τ˜).
Proof. Appendix. 
Lemma 1 implies that CCAs might be targeting multiple
lines, which we generalize in the next theorem.
Theorem 1. (Multiple Targets) Let J be an arbitrary index
set, and let S∗
α, j ∈ S
∗(ej, τ˜j ) be CIs (for different lines) for
all j ∈ J. Suppose there exists a CCA targeting substations
S∗ ∈ 2S such that S∗
α, j
⊂ S∗ for all j ∈ J. Then the CCA S∗
can increase the flow (τ˜j ) on any line from the set {ej }j∈J ,
i.e., S∗ ∈ S(ej, τ˜j ) for all j ∈ J.
Proof. Appendix. 
The CIs’ properties described allow us to study what
happens if we protect the measurements on a substation, which
we state in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. (Defense at a Single Substation) Let J be an
arbitrary index set, and let S∗
α, j ∈ S
∗(ej, τ˜j ) be CIs (targeting
different lines) for all j ∈ J. Moreover, suppose the collec-
tion of target substations {S∗
α, j
}j∈J satisfies ∩j∈JS
∗
α, j
, ∅.
If the grid’s defender protects measurements at substation
s∗
k
∈ ∩j∈JS
∗
α, j
, then one of the following occurs (for all j ∈ J):
(i) If S∗
α, j
is the unique CI that increases the flow (τ˜j )
on line ej , then after s
∗
k
is protected, the new CI S∗
β, j
(not necessarily unique) will require targeting more
substations, i.e., κ∗
β
:= |S∗
β, j
| > |S∗
α, j
|.
(ii) If S∗
α, j is not the only CI, then, after s
∗
k
is protected,
the following might occur: (a) if s∗
k
is common to all
CIs S∗
α, j
∈ S∗α(e, τ˜), then the conclusion in (i) applies;
or (b) if {s∗
k
} ∩ S∗
α, j
= ∅ for some S∗
α, j
∈ S∗α(e, τ˜), then
the new collection of CIs, denoted as S∗
β
(ej, τ˜j ), satisfies
S∗
β
(ej, τ˜j ) ⊂ S
∗
α(ej, τ˜j ).
(iii) The attack is infeasible, i.e., S∗
β
(ej, τ˜j ) ≡ {∅}.
Proof. Appendix. 
Theorem 2 suggests that protecting a substation will pivot
the CI (from one set to a different set). It also suggests
that protecting substation sk ∈ S becomes more critical if
sk is related to more target lines. We discuss more defense
implications next.
B. Defense Implications
In this subsection, we derive the best defense for a line e ∈
E , the best defense against CIs, and the best defense for
substations based on the CIs’ properties.
71) The Best Defense for a Line e ∈ E: Suppose the CCA
Sα, j increases the flow (τ˜) on line e ∈ E , i.e., Sα, j ∈ Sα(e, τ˜).
Then, the best defense for e is to protect the minimal set of
substations Dβ,e ⊆ Sα, j that renders the new CCA S
′
α, j
:= Sα, j\
Dβ,e ineffective, i.e., S
′
α, j
< Sα(e, τ˜). If Sα, j is a CI (i.e., Sα, j ∈
S∗α(e, τ˜)), then Dβ,e = {sk } with sk ∈ Sα, j , i.e., protecting any
substation from Sα, j renders the new CCA ineffective.
On the other hand, CCAs might not remain static; that is,
the adversary might switch between a CI S∗
α, j ∈ S
∗
α(e, τ˜) and a
CCA Sα, j ∈ Sα(e, τ˜) to identify vulnerabilities and hide from
detection. However, if the attacks (S∗
α, j
and Sα, j ) have common
substations, i.e., if S∗
α, j
∩ Sα, j , ∅, then the best defense for
line e is to protect substations satisfying s∗
k
∈ S∗
α, j ∩ Sα, j .
2) The Best Defense against CIs: Suppose κ∗ denotes
the security index for the attack goal (e, τ˜). Then, the best
defense against CIs (i.e., S∗α(e, τ˜)) is to protect the minimal
set of substations Dβ,e that renders the new security index κ
∗
β
greater than κ∗. Thus, the adversary is required to attack more
substations after Dβ,e is protected. Note that Theorem 2 (i)
and (ii-a) describe two special cases of this defense, i.e., when
Dβ,e ≡ {s
∗
k
}.
3) Metrics of Defense Effectiveness: We describe the metric
used to compare defense at substations and to identify the
best defense strategy. Suppose κ∗(e, τ˜) denotes the security
index for the attack goal (e, τ˜). The security index measures
the likelihood of a CCA since it is less likely to attack more
substations than κ∗(e, τ˜). We define the average likelihood to
increase the flow (τ˜) on all lines as
R(τ˜) =
1
m
∑
e∈E
κ
∗(e, τ˜).
Using the average likelihood, we have the following defini-
tion.
Definition 2. For a target flow increase τ˜, the defense effec-
tiveness for substation sk can be estimated by calculating
∆Rβ,sk (τ˜) := Rβ,sk (τ˜) − R(τ˜),
where Rβ,sk (τ˜) :=
1
m
∑
e∈E κ
∗
β,sk
(e, τ˜) denotes the average
likelihood after protecting substation sk .
Theorem 2 implies that ∆Rβ,sk (τ˜) ≥ 0 for all sk ∈ S, i.e.,
after protecting substation sk , the number of target substations
increases, while the average likelihood decreases. Thus, the
best defense strategy is to protect substation s∗
k
such that
∆Rβ,s∗
k
∈ argmaxsk ∈S{∆Rβ,sk }. Note that we derive the metric
for a specific flow increase value (τ˜), but we can always derive
it for the case when τ˜ ∈ (0, τ¯] is a free parameter for all target
lines.
Remark 4. If we integrate κ∗ (i.e., the likelihood of CCAs)
and the likelihood of exploits at the cyber network, we can
derive a risk metric for CCAs at both the cyber and physical
networks. This metric will be studied in our future work.
C. Application: Identifying CCAs
In this subsection, we briefly describe how CIs based on
cyber-traces and CIs based on attack goals identify CCAs and
estimate their possible consequences.
Sα;j(t)
set of suspected
target substations
(e; ~τ)
estimated
consequences
CIs based on
cyber-traces
Knowledge Base
IDSs' sensors
IDSs
of CIs
Fig. 4: Schematic: Identifying CCAs.
CIs based on cyber-traces identify in real time individual
components of CCAs, that is, the set of suspected target
substations. These CIs interpret intrusion data from sensors of
Intrusion Detection Systems (or other security tools) installed
at substations.
CIs based on attack goals estimate the possible conse-
quences of CCAs. The grid’s defender computes these CIs
and stores them in a knowledge base. The grid’s defender can
update this knowledge base of CIs as needed.
Fig. 4 depicts a schematic of how the CIs work together.
The CIs based on cyber-traces output the set of suspected
target substations Sα, j (t) (at some time t) to the knowledge
base of CIs. The knowledge base of CIs compares this set
of suspected target substations with the CIs (and their mathe-
matical properties) to estimate possible consequences (e, τ˜).
This approach is analogous to signature-based (also know
as blacklist) detection techniques [30]. Nevertheless, the CIs
(signatures) are derived based on the attack template instead
of direct network knowledge. Thus, combining CIs with other
direct-knowledge based approaches in IDS will significantly
improve defense performance and allow taking immediate
actions upon most harmful attacks. We will provide details
of this approach in a different paper.
VII. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we provide numerical experiments to illus-
trate the CIs, their properties, defense implications, and the
metric of defense effectiveness.
Fig. 5 shows the New England 39 bus system used to
model a power grid with ns = 6 substations. We selected
two target lines, e = (2, 25) and e′ = (16, 21); and the flow
increase τ˜ ∈ {2.5%, 5%, 7.5%, 10%} to describe attack goals.
The parameters used in our experiments were: M = 500,
a¯ = 0.1, and the SCED base case data for the New England
system taken from MATPOWER software package [31].
A. Experiment 1. Computing the CIs
In this experiment, we derived the CIs for the attack
goals (e, τ˜) and (e′, τ˜) using Algorithm 1. We implemented
Algorithm 1 using CVX (a package for solving convex and
linear mixed integer programs [32]). Tables I and II present the
collection of CIs. We found that all attack goals have unique
CIs but (e, 5%).
B. Experiment 2. CIs Dependence on the parameter a¯
In this experiment, we studied the CIs’ dependence on a¯.
Fig. 6 shows how the security index κ∗ changes as we increase
the attack signal max value a¯. We found that the security index
decreases as a¯ increases. This result imply that if the defender
increases a¯ in the attack template, the defense implications
become more conservative.
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Fig. 5: New England 39 bus system.
TABLE I: Correlation Indices for line e = (2, 25).
Attack goal CIs Security index
S∗α(e, 2.5%) {2} κ
∗
= 1
S∗
β
(e, 2.5%) {5, 6} κ∗
β
= 2
S∗α(e, 5%) {2, 5, 6}, {4, 5, 6} κ
∗
= 3
S∗
β
(e, 5%) {4, 5, 6} κ∗
β
= 3
S∗α(e, 7.5%) {1, 2, 5, 6} κ
∗
= 4
S∗
β
(e, 7.5%) {∅} κ∗
β
= 0
S∗α(e, 10%) {S } κ
∗
= 6
S∗
β
(e, 10%) {∅} κ∗
β
= 0
Note: S∗α(e, τ˜) (resp. S
∗
β
(e, τ˜)) denotes the CIs before (resp. after)
protecting s∗
k
= 2. {∅} (or κ∗ = 0) implies the attack is ineffective.
TABLE II: Correlation Indices for line e′ = (21, 24).
Attack goal CIs Security index
S∗α(e
′, 2.5%) {2} κ∗ = 1
S∗
β
(e′, 2.5%) {5, 6} κ∗
β
= 2
S∗α(e
′, 5%) {4, 5, 6} κ∗ = 3
S∗
β
(e′, 5%) {4, 5, 6} κ∗
β
= 3
S∗α(e
′, 7.5%) {∅} κ∗ = 0
S∗
β
(e′, 7.5%) {∅} κ∗
β
= 0
Note: S∗α(e
′, τ˜) (resp. S∗
β
(e′, τ˜)) denotes the CIs before (resp. after)
protecting s∗
k
= 2. {∅} (or κ∗ = 0) implies the attack is ineffective.
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Fig. 6: CIs’ dependence on a¯. Target Line e = (2, 25)
C. Experiment 3. Mathematical Properties of CIs
We studied the mathematical properties of CIs and defense
implications from Theorem 2. Tables I and II show, respec-
TABLE III: Metric of Defense Effectiveness.
Substation s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
∆Rsk (5%) 0.11 0.70 0.02 0.02 0.30 0.30
∆Rsk (7.5%) 0.13 0.54 0.02 0.07 0.2 0.2
tively, the CIs for the attack goals (e, τ˜) and (e′, τ˜), before
and after protecting substation s∗
k
= s2. Before protecting
substation s∗
k
= s2, the CIs have the following defense
implications: for the attack goal (e, 5%), subordinated attacks
of the CI S∗
α, j
= {2, 5, 6} are ineffective (Propositions 1 and
2); and the CCA S∗ = {2, 4, 5, 6} can increase the flow τ˜ = 5%
on both lines e and e′ (Lemma 1 and Theorem 1). And,
after protecting substation s∗
k
= 2, the CIs have the following
defense implications: for the attack goal (e′, 2.5%), the new
security index satisfies κ∗
β
= 2 > 1 = κ∗ (Theorem 2 (i)),
S∗
β
(e, 5%) ⊂ S∗α(e, 5%) (Theorem 2 (ii-b)), and S
∗
β
(e, 7.5%) =
{∅} (Theorem 2 (iii)).
D. Experiment 4. The Metric of Defense Effectiveness.
In this final experiment, we computed the metric of de-
fense effectiveness ∆Rsk (τ˜) for all substations sk ∈ S and
τ˜ ∈ {5%, 7.5%}. Table III presents the results. These results
imply that the best defense is achieved by protecting substa-
tion s∗
k
= s2.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided a method to derive Correlation
Indices (CIs) based on attack goals, which can be used to
estimate attack consequences and identify critical substations
during coordinated attacks. Compared to existing approaches,
our method does not rely on case-by-case numerical simu-
lations of control attacks with few attack goals. Instead, our
method computes the CIs using an analytical attack template
that can model more sophisticated attacks, such as measure-
ment attacks. We modeled the attack template as a bilevel
optimization program and derived Algorithm 1 to solve it.
Algorithm 1 computes the CIs for any given attack goal. These
CIs describe strongly correlated attacks, since the adversary
reaches the goal by attacking the least number of target
substations. We then used a set-theoretic approach to derive the
CIs’ properties. These properties suggest defense implications
against coordinated attacks, including the best defense for a
transmission line, the best defense against strongly correlated
attacks, and the metric of defense effectiveness. Thus, our
method to compute CIs and their properties presents the benefit
of deployment simplicity but faces one limitation, namely the
computational performance of Algorithm 1. However, given
that there is only few substations in the power grid, the
computation performance is unlikely to be a problem. In our
future work, we will use the CIs and their defense implications
together with Intrusion Detection Systems to protect the grid
against coordinated attacks.
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IX. APPENDIX
Proof. (Proposition 2) Assume S∗
α, j ∈ S
∗
α(e, τ˜). We partition
the CI in two arbitrary disjoint sets, i.e., S∗
α, j
= S′
α, j
∪ D
satisfying |S′
α, j
| < κ∗ := |S∗
α, j
|. Since CIs are minimum
cardinality CCAs, then S′
α, j < Sα(e, τ˜), which proves the
proposition. 
Proof. (Lemma 1) Suppose, to get a contradiction, Sα, j ∈
Sα(e, τ˜); then any super-set S
∗ of Sα, j , i.e., Sα, j ⊆ S
∗, is
effective, i.e., S∗ ∈ Sα(e, τ˜). In particular, S
′
α, j
≡ S∗ reaches
the goal (e, τ˜), which contradicts S′
α, j
< Sα(e, τ˜). 
Proof. (Lemma 1) We prove the lemma by cases. (i) Suppose
S∗
α, j
∈ S∗α(e, τ˜) is a super-set of S
′
α, j
, i.e., S∗
α, j
⊇ S′
α, j
. It follows
that S′
α, j
∪ S∗
α, j
≡ S∗
α, j
∈ S∗α(e, τ˜) ⊆ Sα(e, τ˜). Similarly, (ii)
suppose that S∗
α, j ⊆ S
′
α, j . Then, it follows that S
′
α, j ∪ S
∗
α, j =
S′
α, j
∈ Sα(e, τ˜). Finally, (iii) suppose the CI S
∗
α, j
is neither
a subset or super-set of S′
α, j
. Assume, to get a contradiction,
that (S′
α, j ∪ S
∗
α, j ) < Sα(e, τ˜). Then, Proposition 1 implies that
any CCA Sα, j ⊆ (S
′
α, j
∪ S∗
α, j
) does not reach the goal (e, τ˜).
In particular, Sα, j ≡ S
∗
α, j
⊂ (S′
α, j
∪ S∗
α, j
) does not reach (e, τ˜),
i.e., S∗
α, j
< Sα(e, τ˜). This yields the contradiction. 
Proof. (Theorem 1) We partition the CCA S∗ in the union of
two disjoint sets, i.e., S∗ = S∗
α, j
∪ (S∗ \ S∗
α, j
) for all j ∈ J.
Then, by Lemma 1 we have S∗ ∈ Sα(ej, τ˜j ) for all j ∈ J,
which proves the theorem. 
Proof. (Theorem 2) Assume the operator protects substation
s∗
k
. Moreover, assume that S∗
α, j
∈ S∗α(e, τ˜) is unique and
the attack remains feasible after defense. Suppose, to get a
contradiction, that the new security index satisfy κ∗
β
= κ∗.
This implies that the new CI satisfies S∗
β, j
∈ S∗α(e, τ˜), which
contradicts the fact that S∗α(e, τ˜) = {S
∗
α, j
}. This proves (i).
On the other hand, suppose that S∗
α, j
∈ S∗
α, j
is not unique.
Part (ii-a) can be proven using the same arguments as in
(i). We prove part (ii-b) as follows. Define S := {S∗
α, j
∈
S∗α(e, τ˜) | s
∗
k
∩ S∗
α, j = ∅}. Then we partition the collection
S∗α(e, τ˜) as follows S
∗
α(e, τ˜) = S ∪ (S
∗
α(e, τ˜) \ S). Proposition
1 implies that after defense S∗
α, j
\ {s∗
k
} < S∗
β
(e, τ˜) for all
S∗
α, j ∈ (S
∗
α(e, τ˜) \ S). Thus, S
∗
β
(e, τ˜) ≡ S, and therefore
S∗
β
(e, τ˜) ⊂ S∗α(e, τ˜). This proves (ii-b). Finally, (c) follows
trivially. 
